Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay by Hallock, Kevin F & Olson, Craig A
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Working Papers ILR Collection 
2-27-2009 
Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay 
Kevin F. Hallock 
Cornell University ILR School, kfh7@cornell.edu 
Craig A. Olson 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay 
Abstract 
Who chooses what type of pay? The costs and benefits of “flexible” and “cafeteria-style” benefit plans 
have been discussed for some time. Additionally, many papers have considered the potential costs and 
benefits of certain types of pay plans (e.g. salaries versus piece rates). In this paper, we use detailed data 
from a specific firm that annually set the total compensation level for each of its employees but then did 
something extremely unusual. At the start of each pay year, the firm set an exchange rate for the dollar 
trade-off between cash pay and stock option pay. It then gave every employee nearly complete choice 
over the fraction of their pay that was contingent (stock options, bonus) versus guaranteed (salary). There 
are several empirical findings. There is substantial variation in the choice of contingent pay with some 
workers choosing almost all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock options. Younger 
employees, more experienced employees, higher paid employees, and male employees are more likely to 
allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation to at-risk alternatives. The robustness of these 
results varies somewhat depending on the empirical specification and set of covariates used. 
Keywords 
earnings, contingent pay, guaranteed pay, compensation, employee choice 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hallock, K., & Olson, C. A. (2009). Employees’ choice of method of pay. Retrieved [insert date], from 
Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/97/ 
Required Publishers Statement 
Copyright is held by the authors. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/97 
EMPLOYEES’ CHOICE OF METHOD OF PAY 
Kevin F. Hallock Craig A. Olson 
Cornell University and NBER University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
February 27, 2009 
The Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) and the ILR School at Cornell University 
provided generous financial support. The underlying data used in this paper are confidential and cannot 
be revealed without written approval from the firm. A senior manager in the firm has remarkable 
practical insight and an amazing zeal for academic work. We are extraordinarily grateful to this person 
for many discussions, support, and encouragement. We are also appreciative of helpful conversations 
with several other employees of the company, with seminar participants at the Comparative Analysis of 
Enterprise (Micro) Data conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at the Society of Labor 
Economists conference in Cambridge, and with Sam Bacharach, George Boyer, Todd Elder, Maria 
Guadalupe, Lisa Hunter, Lisa Kahn, Felice Klein, David Levine, Claudia Olivetti, and Olga Yakusheva. 
The title is inspired by Brown (1990). 
0 
EMPLOYEES’ CHOICE OF METHOD OF PAY 
Abstract 
Who chooses what type of pay? The costs and benefits of “flexible” and “cafeteria-style” benefit 
plans have been discussed for some time. Additionally, many papers have considered the potential costs 
and benefits of certain types of pay plans (e.g. salaries versus piece rates). In this paper, we use detailed 
data from a specific firm that annually set the total compensation level for each of its employees but then 
did something extremely unusual. At the start of each pay year, the firm set an exchange rate for the 
dollar trade-off between cash pay and stock option pay. It then gave every employee nearly complete 
choice over the fraction of their pay that was contingent (stock options, bonus) versus guaranteed (salary). 
There are several empirical findings. There is substantial variation in the choice of contingent pay with 
some workers choosing almost all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock options. Younger 
employees, more experienced employees, higher paid employees, and male employees are more likely to 
allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation to at-risk alternatives. The robustness of these results 
varies somewhat depending on the empirical specification and set of covariates used. 
Kevin F. Hallock 
ILR School 
Cornell University 
391 Ives Hall (East) 
Ithaca, NY 14853 
and NBER 
(607) 255-3193 
(607) 255-1836 (fax) 
kfh7@cornell.edu 
Craig A. Olson 
Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
217 LIR Building 
504 East Armory Avenue 
Champaign, IL 61820 
(217) 333-2586 
(217) 244-9290 (fax) 
caolson@uiuc.edu 
1 
Why are people paid so many different ways? … How is this allocation achieved? … Individual consumers are in the best 
position to make most informed choices on their own behalf. Delegating or contracting it to others is bound to lead to 
misallocation in most cases. Sherwin Rosen (2000) 
The reason we gave employees a choice was to allow you to evaluate your personal situation and make the choice that best 
suits you. (From the firm’s literature describing a new compensation plan allowing workers to choose their own mix of 
pay). 
Who chooses what type of pay? Recent changes in rules by the United States Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as well as new proposed stock exchange guidelines have led to 
considerable uncertainty over the mix of pay firms in the United States will offer to their employees. To 
be sure, setting the appropriate level of pay is extremely difficult. This is exacerbated when we consider 
the mix of pay that is optimally offered to employees. 
The costs and benefits of “flexible” and “cafeteria-style” benefit plans have been discussed for 
some time (Tropman, 2001). Additionally, many papers have considered the potential costs and benefits 
of certain types of pay plans (e.g. salaries versus piece rates, Lazear, 1986). In this paper, we use detailed 
data from a specific firm that annually set the total compensation level for each of its employees but then 
did something extremely unusual. At the start of each pay year, the firm set an exchange rate for the 
dollar trade-off between cash pay and stock option pay. It then gave every employee nearly total choice 
over the allocation of the total pay among guaranteed salary, at-risk bonus, and stock options. 
In most of Human Resource-related research it is very difficult to infer actor’s true beliefs 
concerning certain phenomena. For example, in determining the relative willingness of employees to 
choose at-risk versus guaranteed levels of pay, as a proxy, researchers could ask a group of students. 
Obviously this method suffers from at least two problems. First, students are not employees so this 
method suffers from the fact that students in a classroom responding to a survey may have different views 
from those actually in an employment situation. Second, even if researchers have the opportunity to 
survey actual workers about a hypothetical situation, the workers may not put as much time and energy 
into the decision as they would if they had some significant actual resources on the line. In the company 
under study in this paper, the employees were making actual choices over their compensation. As a 
result, the findings in this paper are extremely credible. The results are, however, potentially limited to 
the firm context in question. 
This paper will use these unique data to model which employees choose particular types of pay. 
For example, research in psychology suggests that women are considerably less likely to take risky 
actions in the area of finance than are men. Are women, therefore, less likely to choose options in this 
firm? Also, are richer, more senior, higher paid, or more experienced workers more or less likely to 
choose at-risk pay because they are less risk averse than an average employee? This paper will use a 
novel data source from a firm that allowed workers to choose their mix of pay. 
The first section considers some previous work on “flexible” and “cafeteria-style” benefits and 
outlines the conceptual framework. In proposing these ideas, it must be kept in mind that the tests of the 
ideas in this paper are from a single firm that created this unique pay plan. Therefore, it will be difficult 
to generalize these results to other firms. Section two describes some of the unique characteristics of the 
pay plan and provides an example of employee choice. The third section describes the basic data and 
outlines the empirical pay structure through a focus on the choice of a particular type of pay (base, bonus, 
or options). Section five is a brief discussion and section six offers some concluding comments. 
There are several empirical findings in the paper. There is substantial variation in the choice of 
contingent pay with some workers choosing almost all base pay and others choosing almost entirely stock 
options. Younger employees, more experienced employees, higher paid employees, and male employees 
are more likely to allocate a larger fraction of their total compensation to at-risk forms. The robustness of 
these results vary somewhat depending on the empirical specification and set of covariates used. 
1. Previous Work on “Flexible” and “Cafeteria-Style” Benefits and Conceptual Framework 
The idea that compensation is more than one’s salary is well-known. Jobs differ in their level of 
total compensation, level and variety of benefits and a host of other compensating differentials such as 
working conditions (Smith, 1776, Smith, 1979, and Rosen, 1986). The typical idea behind offering 
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flexible benefits is that the worker may not need a particular benefit that is provided by the firm 
(Tropman, 2001). Rather than offering a benefit to a worker that she does not value, the firm could 
replace the benefit with some other benefit or a higher wage. For example, since some workers are 
covered by a spouse’s health insurance, they may not need health insurance from their employers and 
would prefer a higher wage. Some workers don’t have children and, may prefer more vacation over a 
child care center benefit they will not use. 
There is an interesting and important related literature; examples include Oyer (2008), Olson 
(2002), and Woodbury (1983)1. Oyer (2008) develops a model that attempts to consider the reasons for 
offering benefits instead or salary. Reasons include that firms have a comparative advantage in 
purchasing certain benefits due to their size, workers may differ in their preferences for certain benefits 
and it is expensive for workers to match with the appropriate firms, and “some benefits can reduce the 
marginal cost to an employee of extra working time.” Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth, Oyer (2008) finds some evidence for each of these ideas. The idea that workers may have 
differing preferences for certain benefits (or methods of pay) is exactly the idea behind the current paper. 
Of course, trying to find compensating differentials of any kind is difficult work (Brown, 1980). 
An example is the tradeoff between wages and benefits that Olson (2002) highlights. He tries to 
determine whether workers accept lower wages in return for valuable health benefits. Of course this is a 
difficult question since high paid jobs may also have generous benefits and it is difficult for researchers to 
sort out unobserved factors in these types of situations. Olson (2002) uses an instrumental variables 
strategy and finds that wives with their own employer health insurance accept wages that are on the order 
of 1/5 lower than they would have received in a job without the benefits. 
1
 Also see Lazear (1986), Marino and Zabojnik (2008), Oyer (2005), and Oyer and Schaefer (2005) for interesting 
work on the tradeoffs among various types of pay or between compensation and benefits. 
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We now turn to the more specific issue at hand. Rather than considering pay versus benefits, we 
study the mix of pay types chosen by employees2. Are certain workers more likely to choose at-risk pay? 
What if this at-risk pay is individual performance-based? What if it is based on more general firm 
performance? In this section, we will develop ideas that may differentiate between workers that prefer 
different types of pay that will form the basis for the latter empirical analysis. 
1.A Gender 
There is a large literature in psychology and related fields about differences in risk-taking by 
gender. For example, Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) suggest that people tend to overestimate 
the precision of what they know and that this is particularly true for tasks that are difficult, for tasks with 
unpredictable outcomes, and for tasks that don’t have rapid feedback. Although both men and women 
show this overconfidence there is considerable evidence that men seem to be more overconfident than 
women (Lundberg, Fox, and Puncochar, 1994) and this overconfidence may lead people to take more 
risks. Furthermore, this seems to depend on the particular types of tasks being performed (Deaux and 
Farris, 1977). See Mitchell and Mickel (1999) for a perspective on “the meaning of money”. 
A recent paper shows very interesting evidence that is consistent with the fact that men and 
women have different levels of confidence in the area of finance. Barber and Odea (2001) use data on 
over 35,000 households from a discount brokerage firm. They find that men trade much more than 
women; perhaps due to the relative “overconfidence” of men. They further find that this extra trading 
reduces men’s relative returns by 0.94 percent. The gap is even larger for single people. The fact that 
this works in the financial area is consistent with a paper by Beyer (1990) who notes that men are more 
overconfident on “masculine-gender-typed tasks” such as stock trading. Prince (1993) also shows that 
men are more confident than women in financial matters. 
In another study related to finance, Powell and Ansic (1997) conducted an experiment with 126 
college students. They found that “females are less risk-seeking than males irrespective of familiarity, 
2
 See Freeman and Rogers (1999) for an interesting account of “what workers want.” There is no discussion there of 
having workers choose their own mix of pay. White (1983) provides evidence from a survey on employee 
preferences in a cafeteria benefit plan. 
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framing, costs or ambiguity.” Further Eckel and Grossman (2002) conducted five experiments with high 
financial stakes. They found that women were substantially more risk-averse than men. As a final 
example, Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999) performed a meta-analysis of 150 studies and found more 
risk-taking among male participants on a variety of tasks. Furthermore, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, 
Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006), using data from about 22,000 people in Germany, find that women 
are less likely to take risks3. 
This research in psychology and other areas seems to suggest that women are less likely to choose 
“at-risk” compensation than men. This would hold both for bonus pay (which is both individual and 
group performance based) and stock option pay (which is entirely group performance based). 
1.B Age 
Many mutual fund companies offer funds that change the mix of the investment over time. For 
example, Fidelity has a “Freedom Fund” and Vanguard has a “2045 Fund” that automatically rebalances a 
portfolio over time. The distribution of high risk relative to low risk investments changes as the 
individual ages. As the investor approaches retirement age, her portfolio automatically readjusts towards 
less risky investments (with lower expected returns) such as treasury bills and away from more risky 
(with higher expected returns) investments such as international or small-firm stocks. 
Investment firms offer this type of investment vehicle for at least two reasons. First, investors 
may not have the time, energy, or know-how to do these rebalances themselves. Second, it makes some 
economic sense to have less at-risk as one heads into retirement since the time horizon for smoothing 
losses from any given investment is so much shorter than at earlier times in a lifetime. This is one reason 
that older workers may prefer to have less of their money “at-risk,” conditioning on their wealth. 
At the other end of the age spectrum, very young workers may have more interest in cash 
compensation since they may be more likely to need to make short-term purchases, even conditioning on 
3
 Sunden and Surette (1998) find that women are less likely to choose risky assets in retirement savings plans. See 
Croson and Gneezy (2004) for a review of gender differences in preferences. 
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other measurable characteristics. For these reasons, there is an expectation that considerably younger and 
considerably older workers are less interested in at-risk pay than other workers. 
1.C Seniority 
Of course age may be correlated with seniority. It could be the case that more senior workers 
know more about the firm and are, therefore, more (or less) confident about the firm’s prospects. We 
expect that more senior workers are necessarily better informed about future prospects of the firm. This is 
especially true once we control for the types of jobs held by a given employee. Therefore, we expect 
more senior workers to prefer at-risk pay if the future of the firm is bright and we expect them to prefer 
guaranteed salary if the future of the firm is bleak. We have no direct information about workers’ 
expectations of the future. However, we will explore the relationship between their pay mix and their 
seniority below. 
1.D Wealth and Compensation Level 
Individuals with less wealth are more likely to face budget constraints than those with more 
wealth. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that workers with less wealth will be less able to afford any 
kind of “deferred” compensation, whether these are through general deferred compensation, tax free 
savings contributions for retirement, bonus compensation that may not come until the end of the pay year, 
or stock option compensation, the proceeds from which may not be realized for some time if ever. 
Since incomes are correlated from year to year and savings rates are correlated with income 
levels, it is reasonable to believe that current total compensation is a good proxy for current wealth. 
Therefore, it is natural to suppose that both wealthier and higher paid (higher total compensation) workers 
are more likely to choose a higher level of at-risk-pay than those with less wealth and lower total 
compensation. There are results from the theory of choice under uncertainty that suggest decreasing 
absolute risk aversion in wealth. So wealthy individuals (proxied here by higher annual total 
compensation) may be more willing to bear more risk. There is evidence that risk aversion declines as 
wealth rises (Carroll, 2000) and that absolute risk tolerance is a function of an individual’s resources 
(Guiso and Paiella, 2001). 
6 
2. Unique Characteristics of the Pay Plan in the Company and an Example 
The compensation plan in the company is very unusual. First, the average level of pay in the 
company during the time period studied was very high and the firm aggressively attempted to hire the 
very best employees it could hire through its high wage policy. The company set each employee’s total 
compensation level on an annual basis. Consider a hypothetical employee whose “total compensation” 
package is $200,000 per year. Although in some “cafeteria” pay plans employees have some discretion 
over benefits choice, this was not the case in this firm. Instead, employees had choice over three 
components of pay; “base” or guaranteed salary, at-risk “bonus” (a combined individual and group 
performance based form of pay), and stock options (a combined group-individual-based performance 
plan). The plan was slightly more complicated than is first apparent so we will discuss each of the 
components in turn. 
Of the three pay components, only one (base salary), was guaranteed over the year. The other 
two forms of pay, at-risk bonus and stock options, involved some form of “contingent” compensation that 
was not guaranteed to the employee from week to week. Employees seeking “guaranteed” pay during the 
year could select base salary as 100% of their pay package and take nothing in at-risk bonus or in stock 
options. But suppose our hypothetical employee chooses to have 80% of her pay package in salary. She 
is, therefore, guaranteed to be paid $160,000 in cash equally spaced over the year. 
The second component of pay was bonus. Employees in the firm were given the opportunity to 
put some of their total compensation “at risk” in a bonus pool4. The level of total pay that could be 
allocated to be at-risk in the bonus was capped at $40,000. Whether and how much of this bonus was 
paid out depended on a combination of an individual’s performance evaluation given to the employee by 
her supervisor and a group performance metric. There were multiple levels of individual and group 
performance (three levels for the group and five levels for the individual) and the employee could lose the 
bonus or earn up to 250 percent of her at-risk bonus pay depending upon how she and her group 
4
 Unfortunately, we don’t currently have information on how likely the bonus was paid off and at what level. 
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performed. The employee had to score in one of the top two individual performance categories (of five) 
and the individual’s group had to score in one of the top two group performance categories (of three) for 
the employee to earn back more than the at-risk amount. 
Returning to our example, the employee who was assigned a level of total compensation of 
$200,000 and chose 80% ($160,000) as salary is left with $40,000 to allocate between options and bonus. 
Suppose she chose to place $20,000 of her total compensation (10% of total compensation) to be “at-risk” 
in the bonus pool. Depending on the combination of her own performance and that of her work group, 
she could earn between $0 and $50,000 as a bonus. 
The final component of the pay program was stock options. A stock option is the right to buy a 
share of stock at a specific price at some time in the future but only after a vesting period passes. For 
example, consider a firm that has a stock price of $17 on January 2, 2005. Suppose that on January 2, 
2005 an employee is granted 1,000 options to buy shares in that firms’ stock at $17 dollars per share but 
that the employee cannot exercise these options for at least two years (until January 2, 2007). Further 
suppose the stock price is $20 on January 3, 2007. On January 3, 2007, the employee could exercise her 
option to buy all 1,000 shares at $17 per share and then could immediately sell the shares of stock for the 
current market price of $20. So she would earn $3 per share X 1,000 shares or $3,000. Alternatively she 
could do a “cashless exercise” and simply exchange her options for $3,000 in cash. 
However, the stock options in the firm in question were slightly different than conventional 
employee stock options because the firm was not publicly traded so there is no “market price” for the 
firms’ stock. However, there were shares in the firm and the share price was set quarterly by an outside 
organization that valued the firm, and therefore the shares in the firm. Each year the firm took the 
information from this accounting organization and set the transaction rate between options and base 
salary. For example, employees would be told they can trade $1,000 of annual salary for a certain 
(specific) number of stock options in a given year. Of course, this price would vary from year to year, 
depending on the valuation of the firm. One quarter of options vested each year for four years. Options 
had a term of ten years and the strike price was set equal to the current stock price at the time of the 
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option grant. This paper is not aimed at directly attempting to determine the value of options to 
employees (Hall and Murphy, 2000, 2002, Hallock and Olson, 2007, and Lambert, Larcker, and 
Verecchia, 1991) or the cost to firms. Rather, it is an attempt to study the mix of pay employees choose 
in this extremely unique setting5. 
Employees could modify their mix of pay once per year and the mix choices remained binding for 
the year. In the event that an employee’s pay increased during the year, the additional pay could only be 
allocated to salary or to options, but not to bonuses. 
3. The Data and Total Pay Structure in the Company 
Confidential data were provided to us from the HR department of the firm and cannot be released 
without written permission from the firm. The firm has at times had more than 1,000 workers. Several 
months of data were given to us for research purposes but we are using a single monthly cross-section in 
this paper. At the time the cross section was taken (some time between 1996 and 2004), there were 529 
employees for which we were given complete data including total compensation, age, gender, seniority, 
race, citizenship, the group for which the individual worked in the firm, whether the individual held a 
graduate degree, and detailed information on the mix of pay chosen by the employee. 
The basic summary statistics are in Table 1. It is clear that these employees are unusually well-
paid: the average annual total pay in the firm was $169,445 for the year in which the data were collected. 
This average counts the sum of salary, the part of total compensation put at-risk as bonus (not the realized 
amount which you will recall can be between 0 and 250% of the at-risk amount) and the value of the 
stock options at the time of the grant as determined by the transaction rate given to the employees at the 
time they chose their pay mix. 
There are several other issues worthy of note in the first column of Table 1. The workers are very 
young as the average age is only 34.7 years. Just under 18% of the employees are women, which is not 
5
 However, this tradeoff does implicitly give an estimate of the value employees place on options. We expect to 
explore this in future work. 
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entirely surprising given the industry in which the firm operates. The level of seniority is also very low: 
the mean is only 858 days (about 2.4 years) and this reflects the firm’s young age. More than one-fifth of 
the employees have graduate degrees, which again is not surprising given the industry in which the firm 
operates. Several of these characteristics differ considerably by gender. The last column in Table 1 
reports the p-value for the difference in means across the male and female samples. When not controlling 
for any other characteristics, women are paid considerably less than men on average, women are more 
likely to be white, are more likely to be U.S. citizens, and are substantially less likely to have graduate 
degrees than men. 
The bottom half of Table 1 documents the mean values for the mix of pay chosen by the workers 
in the firm. On average, the mix of pay is heavily skewed toward guaranteed pay. The average fraction 
of base pay is 83%, the average fraction of stock option pay is about 15%, and the average fraction of 
bonus pay is only about 2%. Additionally, 32% of employees chose all base pay, while 16% chose some 
bonus pay and 64% chose some option pay. Again not controlling for other characteristics, women were 
much more likely than men to choose guaranteed (base) pay and much less likely to choose option pay. 
The differences for bonus pay by gender were not statistically significant from one another. Figure 1 
displays the level of total compensation and the fraction of total compensation that is base pay, bonus pay, 
or option pay, by gender. 
Table 2 and Figure 2 document some sample statistics for the firm by age categories. In Table 2, 
the employees are divided into three categories: “younger,” “medium,” and “older”. There are 178, 175, 
and 176 individuals in these categories, respectively. The age categories are not divided exactly equally 
since it would have required having employees with exactly the same age (down to a tenth of a year) to be 
in different categories. The average “younger” worker is 29 years old. The average “medium” age 
worker is 33 and the average “older” worker is just over 42. Clearly, there is not a lot of variation in the 
ages of the workers. Table 2 demonstrates that some of the variables are statistically different from one 
another when comparing the “younger” to “older” employees. For example, older workers have higher 
levels of total compensation ($201,515 versus $136,639) than younger workers, have more seniority (921 
10 
days versus 694 days), are less likely to not be from the U.S. (12.5% versus 23.03%), and more likely to 
have a graduate degree (26.70% versus 12.92%). 
Figure 2 visually documents some differences in total compensation levels and the chosen mix of 
pay by age categories. The age categories are 20s, 30s, 40s, and 50s and older. In the top left panel of 
Figure 2 we can see that total compensation increases with age up to the 40s and then is slightly lower for 
those in their 50s and above. The fraction of total pay that is chosen as base pay increases by age 
category. Although bonus pay is generally a small component of total pay for all age categories, those in 
their 20s and 50 or older have higher fractions of bonus pay than the others. Finally, the bottom right 
panel of Figure 2 shows that option pay as a fraction of total pay declines monotonically through the age 
categories from on the order of 17% for those in their 20s and to around 10% for those in their 50s and 
above. The bottom part of Table 2 compares the compensation mix variables by the “older” versus 
“younger” age categories. There is no statistically significant difference by these age categories for 
whether employees choose all base pay or some options. However, that older workers are less likely to 
choose any bonus than younger workers (13.71% versus 23.60%). Turning finally to the fraction of pay 
in particular forms we see that older workers, on average, choose a higher fraction of base pay (86.37% 
versus 81.00%) and lower levels of bonus (1.43% versus 2.70%) and stock options (12.20% versus 
16.30%). 
Table 3 and Figure 3 make the same kinds of simple comparisons by seniority level of the 
workers. In the case of Table 3, we have divided the workers into 3 seniority categories: “low seniority,” 
(mean of 314.4 days), “medium seniority,” (mean of 703.8 days), and “high seniority,” (mean of 1,577.2 
days). The three seniority categories are not divided exactly equally since that would have required 
having employees with identical days of seniority to be in different categories. Not surprisingly, the 
“high seniority” workers have higher total compensation than the “low seniority” employees ($217,537 
versus $144,395). They are also substantially more likely to have a graduate degree (35.84% versus 
8.43%). 
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Figure 3 displays information about the level of total compensation and the mix of compensation 
by level of seniority broken into five categories: up to one year, from 1-2 years, from 2-3 years, from 3-4 
years, and greater than 4 years. It is clear from Figure 3 that total compensation increases monotonically 
by these seniority categories. Base pay as a fraction of total pay is highest for the least senior employees 
and declines as seniority increases. Bonus pay as a fraction of total compensation is substantially higher 
for the lowest seniority category (less than one year) at about 5% than it is for any other seniority 
category. Options pay as a fraction of total compensation increases with seniority, except for the very 
most senior workers. The bottom part of Table 3 compares the compensation mix variables by “high 
seniority” versus “low seniority” categories. Although choosing all base pay does not vary by the high 
and low seniority categories, choosing some bonus and some option pay does vary by seniority. The 
“high seniority” employees are substantially less likely to choose some bonus (6.32% versus 35.59%) 
than the “low seniority” workers. At the same time the “high seniority” employees are much more likely 
to choose some option pay (72.41% versus 55.93%). When comparing the mean differences by seniority 
category for the fraction of compensation in a particular type, all three categories vary by the high-low 
seniority categories. The “high seniority” workers choose a lower fraction of base pay (76.93% versus 
86.43%), a substantially lower fraction of bonus pay (0.85% versus 3.76%), and a substantially higher 
fraction of stock options pay (22.24% versus 9.81%). 
Now that we have examined some of the basic pay data without conditioning on a set of 
covariates, we turn to considering the level of total compensation for the employees in the firm. This is a 
variable over which the employees have no choice. As in most firms, employees have their total 
compensation level set at the start of each pay year. However, the employees in the firm we study are 
then given the opportunity to select the fraction of pay they want in salary, at-risk bonus (capped at 
$40,000), and options. 
Table 4 provides simple statistical evidence of the relationships between total compensation and 
measurable characteristics of the employees and their jobs. The dependent variable for each of the 
regressions in Table 4 is the log of total compensation for the employee. In column (1) we see that, not 
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conditioning on any other variables, women earn substantially less than men (e-0.57-1)*100 = -43.45% in 
this firm. In column (2) we add a set of additional controls including an indicator for race (white versus 
non-white), an indicator for U.S. citizenship, and variables in age and age2. Non-U.S. citizens earn less 
and pay increases at a decreasing rate with age. The gender pay gap actually rises with the addition of 
these controls. Column (3) adds controls for seniority and seniority2. Here again, more senior workers 
earn more but at a declining rate. The estimated coefficients on seniority (0.192) and seniority2 (-0.012) 
imply that pay peaks in this firm at 8 years of seniority, which is a very high level of seniority for this 
firm. Column (4) adds the indicator for whether the individual holds a graduate degree. This changes 
almost nothing throughout the paper. Finally, in column (5) a large set of (roughly 40) job indicator 
variables are added to the regression6. These variables change few of the other coefficients, except to 
substantially increase the R2 and reduce the coefficient on female. Surprisingly the coefficient on female 
is still large and negative suggesting that conditional on the measured characteristics in column (5) 
women earn (e-0.324-1)*100 = -27.68% less than men. This is not meant to suggest that there is 
discrimination in this firm. Rather, conditional on the limited set of measurable employee characteristics 
that we have, women earn about 27.68% less than men7. Columns (6) and (7) of Table 4 replicate column 
(5) for men and women, respectively. The negative non-U.S. effect and the age effect continue to be 
statistically significant for men but not for women. The statistically significant seniority effect holds for 
both groups. 
Now that we have documented the basic ideas in the paper, described how the unique pay plan 
works and have demonstrated some simple relationships in the data, we will turn to examining 
employees’ choice of method of pay. In this next section we will consider whether employees differ in 
their choices of mix of pay based on their measurable characteristics, controlling for other characteristics. 
6
 These job indicator variables are not entirely like “occupation” indicators. That is, they do not necessarily help 
map a hierarchy in the firm. Rather, they can be thought of as something like product line categories. 
7
 Again, we should be careful in interpreting this remaining gender wage gap since the “job” indicators do not reflect 
actual job position. 
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4. Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay 
This section is focused on the main empirical part of the paper. Although the pay level in the 
firm in question was set for employees by management, each individual employee had control over the 
fraction of total compensation she could allocate to base pay versus contingent pay. The rest of this 
section examines employee choice of pay mix while considering employee characterstics. 
4.A. Employees’ Choice of Base Pay 
It was clear in Table 1 that the highest fraction of total compensation allocated to any category 
was that of base pay – by a large margin. In fact, on average, employees allocate 82.91 percent of their 
total compensation to base pay. Furthermore 31.57 percent of all employees allocate all of their total 
compensation to base pay. Tables 5 sheds some light onto the characteristics of individual employees 
who make these allocation decisions to the mix of their compensation. 
Table 5 is devoted to considering the correlates of choosing entirely base pay. The dependent 
variable in all columns is equal to 1 if the employee chose all of her pay as salary and is equal to 0 
otherwise8. Marginal effects are reported in the table. Although it appears that women are substantially 
more likely than men to choose all of their compensation in base salary, this effect becomes insignificant 
in columns (6) and (7) when we control for the level of total compensation. Since women are paid less 
than men in this firm (even conditional on a host of measurable characteristics), controlling for the level 
of total compensation makes the effect of female disappear in columns (6) and (7). In fact, the only 
variable that remains strongly important is the level of total compensation. Higher paid employees are 
substantially less likely than lower paid employees to choose all of their compensation in base pay, even 
controlling for a host of characteristics. 
8
 Note that the first four columns of the table have 529 observations and the next 4 columns have 513 observations. 
This is due to the fact that the dependent variable (“entirely base pay”) is perfectly predicted by some of the “job” 
indicators and, therefore, had to be dropped. Columns (4) and (4*) compare specifications with exactly the same set 
of covariates but on the two different samples, which differ by only 16 observations. This problem occurs again 
when we run the specifications separately by gender in columns (8) and (9). This happens (with different sets of 
missing variables) in some subsequent tables. 
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Columns (8) and (9) reveal that when the specification in column (7) is run separately by gender 
the only covariate that matters is total compensation. For both men and women, higher levels of pay are 
associated with a lower probability of choosing all base pay. 
4.B. Employees’ Choice of Bonus Pay 
A similar set of analyses is performed for the choice of bonus as a fraction of total compensation. 
Recall that employees can set aside up to $40,000 of their total compensation as an at-risk performance-
based bonus. Depending on the combination of the employee’s own performance and that of her work 
group, she can earn between 0 and 250% of the at-risk bonus. So those individuals with extraordinary 
confidence in their own abilities and those of their team (and trust in the system) may select a higher 
fraction of their total compensation as bonus. 
Table 6 reports a set of probit specifications where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
employee chooses some bonus and is equal to zero otherwise. Recall form Table 1 that only 16.07% of 
employees have any at-risk bonus. Marginal effects are reported in the table. There are two clear 
findings in this table. First, higher paid employees are more likely to choose at least some bonus as part 
of their compensation plan. Second, older and workers with more seniority are less likely to choose some 
bonus. 
4.C. Employees’ Choice of Stock Options 
Table 7 reports the probit estimates for employee choice of stock options. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if the employee chooses some stock options and is equal to zero otherwise. 
Although women appear to be substantially less likely to choose stock options than men, this result 
declines substantially once we control for the other covariates. In fact, if we control for the level of 
compensation in column (6), there is still a gender gap – women are 14% less likely than men to choose 
some option pay. On the other hand, if we control for the log of total compensation as in column (7), 
there is no statistically significant gap between men and women in terms of the probability of choosing 
some options in their pay plan. Older workers are less likely to choose any options and more senior 
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workers are more likely to choose options (with quadratic terms again significant in both cases). Higher 
paid employees are more likely to choose some option pay9. 
4.D More on Base, Bonus, and Options 
In sections 4.A – 4.C we investigated the relationship between choosing entirely base pay, some 
bonus, and some stock options on various employee characteristics using probit analysis. An analogous 
specification using OLS might be to investigate the relationship between the same set of right hand side 
variables and the ratio of base, bonus, and option compensation to total compensation (e.g. the fraction of 
total pay from base, the fraction of total pay from at-risk bonus, and the fraction of total pay from 
options). Results from this specification are difficult to interpret since total pay is in the denominator of 
the dependent variable and appears as a right hand side variable. Instead, in this section, we investigate 
the relationship between the level of base pay (Table 8), the level of at-risk bonus pay (Table 9), the level 
of stock options pay (Table 10) and a host of characteristics including, and most importantly, the level of 
total compensation for the employee. In this specification the coefficient on total compensation is an 
estimate of the marginal effect of a dollar in total compensation on base pay (table 8), at-risk pay (table 9) 
and stock options (table 10). 
An investigation of Table 8 makes is clear that, conditional on a set of covariates, employees in 
this firm allocate a substantially larger fraction of their marginal total compensation dollar to base pay 
than they do to other components of pay. In columns (1) – (7) of Table 8 the estimated coefficients on 
total compensation suggest that between 60% and 70% of each additional dollar of total compensation is 
allocated to base pay. The estimated coefficients on total compensation in Table 9 suggest that, at best, a 
few percent of total compensation goes to at-risk bonus. Finally, the estimated coefficients on total 
compensation in Table 10 imply that up to 30% of total pay is allocated to stock options, even conditional 
on a wide set of covariates. 
9
 We have re-run the specifications in Tables 5-7 by quintiles of the level of total compensation. The results are 
extremely stables across quintiles of total pay. 
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Tables 8 – 10 also report interesting differences in allocation decisions by gender. Columns 9 
(male) and 10 (female) run the base (Table 8), at-risk bonus (Table 9), and stock options (Table 10) 
specifications separately by gender. Collectively, these specifications clearly reveal the same patterns 
suggested by the probit analyses of Table 5-7. That is, men allocate a higher fraction of their total pay to 
“at risk” compensation in the form of stock options and at-risk bonus than women. Women, on the other 
hand, are much more likely to choose a higher fraction of their pay as guaranteed salary. 
5. Discussion 
Of course the results from this study are very difficult to generalize since this is one firm at one 
point in time. In fact, perhaps due to this unusual and innovative compensation plan a particular type of 
worker (e.g. ones interested in “at-risk” pay) was more likely to select into the firm. That is, although all 
workers in the firm were given total choice over their method of pay, perhaps the set of incumbent 
workers is not a random selection of workers. Discussions with several workers at the firm suggest 
something that is consistent with this. There is an overwhelming sense that the firm wants to (and 
succeeds at) hiring highly intelligent workers. This is certainly consistent with the extremely high levels 
of total compensation. Whether these results would hold up in other firms is an open and interesting 
question that may, unfortunately, be difficult to test since few firms have such a unique compensation 
plan. 
Besides the high level of total compensation, the results in the early tables suggest that the 
employees in this firm are extremely young. Therefore, although there are several significant age effects 
in the data, even after controlling for many additional variables, there is not a lot of variation in the age of 
the workers. 
One other issue of potential importance is that of whether the employees may have been expected 
to hold a certain level of contingent pay. It is unlikely that this was the case for at-risk bonus pay since 
the mean level of such holdings is so incredibly small. However, there could have been some pressure for 
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employees (or some sub-set of employees) to choose stock options, so as to show that they are “loyal” to 
the mission of the overall organization. Literature given to the employees prior to making their pay mix 
choices is very clear on this, however. In a “FAQ” section, the firm lists the following question “Will I 
be judged by how much I put at risk or how I decide to split my at risk amount?” The answer in the 
literature is “No, the reason we gave employees a choice was to allow you to evaluate your personal 
situation and make the choice that best suits you.” 
6. Concluding Comments 
Subject to several qualificationns, including those pointed out in Section 5 above, the firm studied 
in this paper embarked on an extremely unusual compensation plan. The firm set the total compensation 
of each employee and offered three types of compensation: base salary, at-risk bonus, and stock options. 
It then gave each employee choice over the mix of pay. 
Younger employees, more experienced employees, higher paid employees, and male employees 
are more likely to allocate a higher fraction of their total compensation to at-risk forms of pay. The 
robustness of these results varies somewhat depending on the empirical specification and set of covariates 
used. 
An interesting issue is that of the costs and benefits of organizing a plan such as the one described 
in this paper in the first place. When discussing the mix of pay, Rosen (2000) stated “Individual 
consumers are in the best position to make the most informed choices on their own behalf. Delegating or 
contracting it to others is bound to lead to misallocation in most cases”. But is it optimal for firms to give 
employees complete choice over their mix of pay? Perhaps stock options are better suited to more senior 
managers and spot bonuses are better suited to more lower-level workers. If it is the case that choice is 
good for workers, at what point should the choice end (e.g. benefits, mix of pay, flex time, etc.)? Clearly 
more flexible total compensation plans can be more costly to administer. However, this does not mean 
that they are not more productive in the longer run. 
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This paper is part of a larger research program investing the value employees place on contingent 
pay and the costs of and benefits of such compensation to firms. Our hope is that investigating the actual 
compensation mix decisions of all of the employees in a single firm is a useful step in understanding how 
to design pay packages for employees in firms. 
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FIGURE 1. Total Compensation and Employee’s Choice of Method of Pay by Gender 
Level and Mix of Pay by Gender 
Total Compensation 
Female Male 
Bonus Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
Female Male 
Base Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
Female Male 
Option Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
Female Male 
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FIGURE 2. Total Compensation and Employee’s Choice of Method of Pay by Age 
Level and Mix of Pay by Age 
Total Compensation 
age 20-30 age 30-40 age 40-50 age 50+ 
Bonus Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
age 20-30 age 30-40 age 40-50 age 50+ 
Base Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
age 20-30 age 30-40 age 40-50 age 50+ 
Option Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
age 20-30 age 30-40 age 40-50 age 50+ 
Note: “age 20-30” corresponds to (20 <= age < 30) 
“age 30-40” corresponds to (30<= age < 40) 
“age 40-50” corresponds to (40<= age < 50) 
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FIGURE 3. Total Compensation and Employees’ Choice of Method of Pay by Seniority 
Level and Mix of Pay by Years of Seniority 
Total Compensation Base Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
Mill Mill 
sen 0-1 sen 1-2 sen 2-3 sen 3-4 sen 4+ sen 0-1 sen 1-2 sen 2-3 sen 3-4 sen 4+ 
Bonus Pay as Fraction of Total Pay Option Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
..ill 
sen 0-1 sen 1-2 sen 2-3 sen 3-4 sen 4+ sen 0-1 sen 1-2 sen 2-3 sen 3-4 sen 4+ 
Note: “sen 0-1” corresponds to (0 <= years of seniority < 1) 
“sen 1-2” corresponds to (1 <= years of seniority < 2) 
“sen 2-3” corresponds to (2 <= years of seniority < 3) 
“sen 3-4” corresponds to (3 <= years of seniority < 4) 
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FIGURE 4. Employee’s Choice of Method of Pay by Total Compensation 
Mix of Pay by Level of Pay 
Base Pay as Fraction of Total Pay Bonus Pay as Fraction of Total Pay 
0-1 00k 100-200k 200-300k 300k+ 
Option Pay as Fraction of Total 
0-100k 100-200k 200-300k 300k+ 
0-1 
Pay 
00k 100-200k 200-300k 300k+ 
Note: “0-100k” corresponds to (0 <= total compensation < $100,000) 
“100-200k” corresponds to ($100,000 <= total compensation < $200,000) 
“200-300k” corresponds to ($200,000 <= total compensation < $300,000) 
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TABLE 1. Summary Statistics by Gender 
Total Pay 
Log(Total Pay) 
Age 
Female (%) 
Seniority (days) 
White (%) 
Non-U.S. (%) 
Graduate Degree (%) 
All Base Pay (0,1) 
Some Bonus Pay (0,1) 
Some Option Pay (0,1) 
(%) Base Pay 
(%) Bonus Pay 
(%) Stock Option Pay 
N 
All 
169,445 
(4,060) 
11.90 
(0.02) 
34.70 
(0.28) 
17.96 
(1.67) 
858.4 
(28.6) 
77.32 
(1.82) 
20.98 
(1.77) 
22.31 
(1.81) 
31.57 
(2.02) 
16.07 
(1.60) 
64.08 
(2.09) 
82.91 
(0.80) 
1.87 
(0.21) 
15.23 
(0.78) 
529 
Men 
181,996 
(4,471) 
12.00 
(0.02) 
34.56 
(0.30) 
0.00 
(0) 
876.3 
(31.9) 
75.81 
(2.06) 
23.04 
(2.02) 
25.35 
(2.09) 
27.42 
(2.14) 
17.05 
(1.81) 
68.43 
(2.23) 
81.19 
(0.90) 
1.91 
(0.09) 
16.90 
(0.81) 
434 
Women 
112,243 
(7,236) 
11.43 
(0.07) 
35.34 
(0.77) 
1.00 
(0) 
776.7 
(63.5) 
84.21 
(3.76) 
11.58 
(3.30) 
8.42 
(2.86) 
50.53 
(5.16) 
11.58 
(3.30) 
44.21 
(5.12) 
90.75 
(1.46) 
1.66 
(0.49) 
7.59 
(1.35) 
95 
p-valuea 
0.000 
0.000 
0.289 
--
0.181 
0.077 
0.013 
0.000 
0.000 
0.1891 
0.000 
0.000 
0.642 
0.000 
Notes: (a) p-value for testing whether the mean of the variables are significantly different by gender. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 2. Summary Statistics by Age Categories 
Total Pay 
Log(Total Pay) 
Age 
Female (%) 
Seniority (days) 
White (%) 
Non-U.S. (%) 
Graduate Degree (%) 
All Base Pay (0,1) 
Some Bonus Pay (0,1) 
Some Option Pay (0,1) 
(%) Base Pay 
(%) Bonus Pay 
(%) Stock Option Pay 
N 
All 
169,445 
(4,060) 
11.90 
(0.02) 
34.70 
(0.28) 
17.96 
(1.67) 
858.4 
(28.6) 
77.32 
(1.82) 
20.98 
(1.77) 
22.31 
(1.81) 
31.57 
(2.02) 
16.07 
(1.60) 
64.08 
(2.09) 
82.91 
(0.80) 
1.87 
(0.21) 
15.23 
(0.78) 
529 
Younger 
136,639 
(4,282) 
11.74 
(0.03) 
28.87 
(0.07) 
19.66 
(2.99) 
693.81 
(25.86) 
74.16 
(3.29) 
23.03 
(3.16) 
12.92 
(2.52) 
29.78 
(3.44) 
23.60 
(3.19) 
65.73 
(3.57) 
81.00 
(1.42) 
2.70 
(0.40) 
16.30 
(1.39) 
178 
Medium 
170,559 
(7,049) 
11.90 
(0.04) 
33.02 
(0.12) 
14.29 
(2.65) 
962.62 
(51.21) 
75.43 
(3.26) 
27.43 
(3.38) 
27.43 
(3.38) 
29.55 
(3.45) 
10.80 
(2.34) 
66.48 
(3.57) 
81.37 
(1.52) 
1.46 
(0.37) 
17.18 
(1.51) 
175 
Older 
201,515 
(8,336) 
12.06 
(0.04) 
42.26 
(0.41) 
19.89 
(3.02) 
921.23 
(62.27) 
82.39 
(2.88) 
12.50 
(2.50) 
26.70 
(3.34) 
35.43 
(3.63) 
13.71 
(2.61) 
60.00 
(3.71) 
86.37 
(1.14) 
1.43 
(0.31) 
12.20 
(1.07) 
176 
p-valuea 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.958 
0.001 
0.061 
0.010 
0.001 
0.258 
0.017 
0.266 
0.003 
0.012 
0.021 
Notes: (a) p-values are for testing whether the means of the variables are significantly different by age 
(“younger” versus “older”). 
The three age categories are not divided exactly equally since it would have required having employees 
with identical ages (down to a tenth of a year) to be in different categories. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 3. Summary Statistics by Seniority Categories 
Total Pay 
Log(Total Pay) 
Age 
Female (%) 
Seniority (days) 
White (%) 
Non-U.S. (%) 
Graduate Degree (%) 
All Base Pay (0,1) 
Some Bonus Pay (0,1) 
Some Option Pay (0,1) 
(%) Base Pay 
(%) Bonus Pay 
(%) Stock Option Pay 
N 
All 
169,445 
(4,060) 
11.90 
(0.02) 
34.70 
(0.28) 
17.96 
(1.67) 
858.4 
(28.6) 
77.32 
(1.82) 
20.98 
(1.77) 
22.31 
(1.81) 
31.57 
(2.02) 
16.07 
(1.60) 
64.08 
(2.09) 
82.91 
(0.80) 
1.87 
(0.21) 
15.23 
(0.78) 
529 
Low Seniority 
144,395 
(6,189) 
11.73 
(0.04) 
35.24 
(0.52) 
21.91 
(3.11) 
314.4 
(9.1) 
75.28 
(3.24) 
22.47 
(3.14) 
8.43 
(2.09) 
33.33 
(3.55) 
35.59 
(3.61) 
55.93 
(3.74) 
86.43 
(1.06) 
3.76 
(0.45) 
9.81 
(0.94) 
178 
Med. Seniority 
147,754 
(5,357) 
11.81 
(0.03) 
33.64 
(0.47) 
12.36 
(2.47) 
703.8 
(10.3) 
77.53 
(3.14) 
24.16 
(3.22) 
23.03 
(3.16) 
34.83 
(3.58) 
6.18 
(1.81) 
64.04 
(3.61) 
85.19 
(1.28) 
0.97 
(0.30) 
13.85 
(1.23) 
178 
High Seniority 
217,537 
(7,985) 
12.17 
(0.04) 
35.23 
(0.46) 
19.65 
(3.03) 
1,577.2 
(50.3) 
79.19 
(3.10) 
16.18 
(2.81) 
35.84 
(3.66) 
26.44 
(3.35) 
6.32 
(1.85) 
72.41 
(3.40) 
76.93 
(1.65) 
0.85 
(0.28) 
22.24 
(1.62) 
173 
p-valuea 
0.000 
0.000 
0.990 
0.604 
0.000 
0.384 
0.137 
0.000 
0.159 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Notes: (a) p-values are for testing whether the means of the variables are significantly different by 
seniority (“low seniority” versus “high seniority”). 
The three seniority categories are not divided exactly equally since it would have requires having 
employees with identical days of seniority to be in different categories. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 4. Determinants of Total Compensation 
OLS, Dependent Variable: Log(Total Compensation) 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Senioritya) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
Job Indicatorsb 
Constant 
R2 (adjusted) 
N 
(1) 
-0.570*** 
(0.056) 
No 
12.002*** 
(0.024) 
0.161 
529 
(2) 
-0.583*** 
(0.054) 
-0.041 
(0.055) 
-0.143** 
(0.057) 
0.121*** 
(0.028) 
-0.133*** 
(0.036) 
No 
9.514*** 
(0.534) 
0.235 
529 
(3) 
-0.550*** 
(0.050) 
-0.049 
(0.051) 
-0.120** 
(0.053) 
0.090*** 
(0.026) 
-0.095*** 
(0.033) 
0.192*** 
(0.029) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
No 
9.784*** 
(0.504) 
0.351 
529 
(4) 
-0.549*** 
(0.051) 
-0.047 
(0.051) 
-0.121*** 
(0.053) 
0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.094*** 
(0.034) 
0.190*** 
(0.030) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.010 
(0.050) 
No 
9.784*** 
(0.504) 
0.351 
529 
(5) 
-0.324*** 
(0.053) 
0.046 
(0.047) 
-0.112** 
(0.048) 
0.094*** 
(0.025) 
-0.099*** 
(0.032) 
0.180*** 
(0.029) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.026 
(0.045) 
Yes 
9.696*** 
(0.618) 
0.509 
529 
(6) 
male 
0.032 
(0.044) 
-0.136*** 
(0.044) 
0.078*** 
(0.024) 
-0.081*** 
(0.031) 
0.164*** 
(0.029) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
-0.036 
(0.041) 
Yes 
10.009*** 
(0.568) 
0.489 
434 
(7) 
female 
0.296 
(0.189) 
0.194 
(0.225) 
0.123 
(0.112) 
-0.126 
(0.143) 
0.253*** 
(0.096) 
-0.030*** 
(0.011) 
-0.117 
(0.300) 
Yes 
8.048*** 
(2.336) 
0.384 
95 
Notes: (a) Seniority is measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification 
indicators. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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TABLE 5. Determinants of Choosing Entirely Base Pay 
Probit (marginal effects reported), Dependent Variable: Entirely Base Pay = 1, not = 0 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Seniority) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
(Total 
Comp)/100k 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
R2 (pseudo) 
N 
(1) 
0.231*** 
(0.056) 
No 
0.028 
529 
(2) 
0.233*** 
(0.056) 
0.032 
(0.053) 
0.022 
(0.057) 
0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.036 
(0.035) 
No 
0.032 
529 
(3) 
0.233*** 
(0.057) 
0.040 
(0.053) 
0.029 
(0.058) 
0.030 
(0.028) 
-0.033 
(0.036) 
-0.107*** 
(0.035) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
No 
0.051 
529 
(4) 
0.237*** 
(0.057) 
0.044 
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.058) 
0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.030 
(0.036) 
-0.112*** 
(0.036) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.033 
(0.055) 
No 
0.051 
529 
(4*) 
0.243*** 
(0.058) 
0.046 
(0.055) 
0.027 
(0.059) 
0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.029 
(0.036) 
-0.109*** 
(0.035) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.045 
(0.056) 
No 
0.052 
513 
(5) 
0.172** 
(0.072) 
0.006 
(0.060) 
0.030 
(0.062) 
0.011 
(0.033) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
-0.084** 
(0.040) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.050 
(0.059) 
Yes 
0.131 
513 
(6) 
0.095 
(0.073) 
0.027 
(0.059) 
-0.003 
(0.060) 
0.042 
(0.035) 
-0.052 
(0.045) 
-0.058 
(0.042) 
0.013 
(0.005) 
0.047 
(0.059) 
-0.205*** 
(0.042) 
Yes 
0.174 
513 
(7) 
0.062 
(0.074) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
0.004 
(0.060) 
0.043** 
(0.035) 
-0.052 
(0.044) 
-0.040 
(0.042) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.044 
(0.059) 
-0.341*** 
(0.067) 
Yes 
0.177 
513 
(8) 
male 
0.006 
(0.061) 
-0.021 
(0.058) 
0.025 
(0.036) 
-0.026 
(0.046) 
-0.011 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.040 
(0.058) 
-0.364*** 
(0.080) 
Yes 
0.137 
413 
(9) 
female 
0.397 
(0.197) 
0.391 
(0.203) 
0.004 
(0.178) 
-0.016 
(0.228) 
-0.098 
(0.174) 
0.014 
(0.027) 
-0.381 
(0.328) 
-0.372** 
(0.171) 
Yes 
0.319 
74 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The N in column (7) is greater than the sum of the 
Ns in columns (8) and (9) since some observations were perfectly predicted in the latter two columns. 
31 
TABLE 6. Determinants of Choosing Some Bonus Pay 
Probit (marginal effects reported), Dependent Variable: Some Bonus Pay = 1, not = 0 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Senioritya) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
(Total 
Pay)/100k 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
R2 (adjusted) 
N 
(1) 
-0.055 
(0.037) 
No 
0.004 
529 
(2) 
-0.058 
(0.036) 
-0.052 
(0.045) 
-0.056 
(0.038) 
-0.060*** 
(0.020) 
0.071*** 
(0.026) 
No 
0.034 
529 
(3) 
-0.058* 
(0.030) 
-0.032 
(0.040) 
-0.060* 
(0.031) 
-0.041** 
(0.018) 
0.046** 
(0.023) 
-0.143*** 
(0.023) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
No 
0.156 
529 
(4) 
-0.056 
(0.030) 
-0.030 
(0.040) 
-0.061* 
(0.031) 
-0.042** 
(0.019) 
0.048** 
(0.024) 
-0.145*** 
(0.024) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023 
(0.043) 
No 
0.157 
529 
(4*) 
-0.028 
(0.046) 
-0.028 
(0.048) 
-0.089** 
(0.038) 
-0.043* 
(0.024) 
0.049* 
(0.024) 
-0.220*** 
(0.034) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.050) 
No 
0.180 
427 
(5) 
-0.040 
(0.050) 
-0.012 
(0.048) 
-0.078* 
(0.038) 
-0.037 
(0.024) 
0.041 
(0.031) 
-0.211*** 
(0.036) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.027 
(0.052) 
Yes 
0.234 
427 
(6) 
-0.013 
(0.056) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.067 
(0.040) 
-0.048* 
(0.025) 
0.052 
(0.031) 
-0.224*** 
(0.037) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.032 
(0.053) 
0.064** 
(0.028) 
Yes 
0.246 
427 
(7) 
0.022 
(0.064) 
-0.014 
(0.047) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
-0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.057* 
(0.032) 
-0.242*** 
(0.038) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.034 
(0.052) 
0.177*** 
(0.051) 
Yes 
0.263 
427 
(8) 
male 
0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.046 
(0.042) 
-0.047* 
(0.026) 
0.048 
(0.033) 
-0.274*** 
(0.042) 
0.024*** 
(0.005) 
0.073 
(0.058) 
0.165*** 
(0.058) 
Yes 
0.297 
364 
(9) 
female 
-0.223 
(0.266) 
-0.097 
(0.142) 
-0.100 
(0.127) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.181 
(0.148) 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.261*** 
(0.145) 
Yes 
0.229 
50 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The N in column (7) is greater than the sum of the Ns in columns (8) and (9) since some observations were perfectly predicted in the latter 
two columns. 
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TABLE 7. Determinants of Choosing Some Option Pay 
Probit (marginal effects reported), Dependent Variable: Some Option Pay = 1, not = 0 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Senioritya) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
(Total 
Comp)/100k 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
R2 (pseudo) 
N 
(1) 
-0.242*** 
(0.056) 
No 
0.028 
529 
(2) 
-0.246*** 
(0.056) 
0.031 
(0.057) 
0.005 
(0.058) 
-0.025 
(0.029) 
0.029 
(0.036) 
No 
0.030 
529 
(3) 
-0.247*** 
(0.058) 
0.021 
(0.058) 
0.002 
(0.059) 
-0.027 
(0.029) 
0.034 
(0.038) 
0.201*** 
(0.038) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
No 
0.076 
529 
(4) 
-0.252*** 
(0.058) 
0.015 
(0.058) 
0.005 
(0.060) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
0.030 
(0.038) 
0.207*** 
(0.039) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
-0.043 
(0.057) 
No 
0.077 
529 
(4*) 
-0.259*** 
(0.059) 
0.013 
(0.059) 
0.001 
(0.060) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
0.031 
(0.038) 
0.201*** 
(0.039) 
-0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.052 
(0.058) 
No 
0.079 
517 
(5) 
-0.202*** 
(0.074) 
0.057 
(0.064) 
-0.003 
(0.063) 
-0.013 
(0.034) 
0.022 
(0.044) 
0.185*** 
(0.043) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.059 
(0.061) 
Yes 
0.144 
517 
(6) 
-0.140* 
(0.077) 
0.043 
(0.065) 
0.028 
(0.062) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
0.048 
(0.046) 
0.170*** 
(0.044) 
-0.024*** 
(0.006) 
-0.056 
(0.061) 
0.169*** 
(0.042) 
Yes 
0.172 
517 
(7) 
-0.113 
(0.078) 
0.045 
(0.065) 
0.025 
(0.062) 
-0.039* 
(0.036) 
0.049 
(0.046) 
0.154*** 
(0.044) 
-0.021*** 
(0.005) 
-0.054 
(0.061) 
0.289*** 
(0.068) 
Yes 
0.173 
517 
(8) 
male 
0.063 
(0.067) 
0.048 
(0.061) 
-0.007 
(0.037) 
0.005 
(0.047) 
0.142*** 
(0.046) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.063 
(0.062) 
0.265*** 
(0.081) 
Yes 
0.130 
417 
(9) 
female 
-0.517 
(1.198) 
-0.989 
(5.280) 
0.050 
(2.498) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.292 
(1.460) 
-0.044 
(0.222) 
0.652*** 
(0.136) 
0.190 
(0.951) 
Yes 
0.646 
71 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The N in column (7) is greater than the sum of the Ns in columns (8) and (9) since some observations were perfectly predicted in the latter 
two columns. 
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TABLE 8. Determinants of Choice of Base Pay: OLS, Dependent Variable = Base Pay 
Total Comp 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Seniority) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
Constant 
R2 
N 
(1) 
-44612*** 
(8365) 
No 
143232*** 
(3544) 
0.049 
529 
(2) 
0.695*** 
(0.018) 
No 
17395*** 
(3518) 
0.735 
529 
(3) 
0.700*** 
(0.019) 
4218 
(4615) 
No 
15793*** 
(3930) 
0.775 
529 
(4) 
0.673*** 
(0.020) 
1952 
(4603) 
1457 
(4433) 
3988 
(4654) 
4141* 
(2313) 
-36 
(29) 
No 
-79759* 
(43488) 
0.745 
529 
(5) 
0.689*** 
(0.021) 
2143 
(4538) 
2123 
(4360) 
4451 
(4567) 
3983* 
(2279) 
-36 
(29) 
-11573*** 
(2566) 
1247*** 
(296) 
No 
-61448 
(43084) 
0.754 
529 
(6) 
0.689*** 
(0.021) 
2866 
(4566) 
2928 
(4397) 
4061 
(4572) 
3525 
(2303) 
-31 
(29) 
-12455*** 
(2646) 
1318*** 
(300) 
5809 
(4293) 
Yes 
-52689 
(43534) 
0.754 
529 
(7) 
0.605*** 
(0.023) 
6240 
(4887) 
5352 
(4266) 
3279 
(4341) 
3504 
(2297) 
-32 
(29) 
-6817** 
(2682) 
723** 
(298) 
4464 
(4049) 
Yes 
-12508 
(55948) 
0.794 
529 
(8) 
14612*** 
(5368) 
5841 
(4600) 
475 
(4672) 
3683 
(2480) 
-36 
(31) 
-10866*** 
(2943) 
1451*** 
(326) 
5412 
(4367) 
102713*** 
(4433) 
Yes 
-1140940 
(73884) 
0.761 
529 
(9) 
male 
0.575*** 
(0.027) 
4738 
(4905) 
1016 
(4938) 
3936 
(2734) 
-34 
(35) 
-8690*** 
(3269) 
977*** 
(359) 
4512 
(4542) 
Yes 
-19110 
(63421) 
0.774 
434 
(10) 
female 
0.756*** 
(0.039) 
12769** 
(6276) 
19283** 
(7381) 
2934 
(3733) 
-42 
(47) 
2354 
(3272) 
-230 
(353) 
1422 
(9830) 
Yes 
-28710 
(77921) 
0.921 
95 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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TABLE 9. Determinants of Choice of Bonus Pay: OLS, Dependent Variable = Bonus Pay 
Total Comp 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Seniority) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
Constant 
R2 
N 
(1) 
-1222 
(980) 
No 
3138*** 
(415) 
0.001 
529 
(2) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
No 
1879** 
(779) 
0.003 
529 
(3) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
-866 
(1022) 
No 
2208** 
(871) 
0.002 
529 
(4) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-963 
(1041) 
-1081 
(1002) 
-1662 
(1050) 
-614 
(523) 
7.38 
(6.65) 
No 
15424 
(9833) 
0.003 
529 
(5) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-620 
(1019) 
-929 
(979) 
-1592 
(1026) 
-498 
(512) 
5.68 
(6.51) 
-2152*** 
(576) 
130* 
(66) 
No 
15566 
(9675) 
0.050 
529 
(6) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-494 
(1026) 
-790 
(988) 
-1660 
(1028) 
-578 
(517) 
6.61 
(6.57) 
-2305*** 
(594) 
142** 
(67) 
1007 
(965) 
Yes 
17085 
(9783) 
0.050 
529 
(7) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-1047 
(1129) 
-874 
(985) 
-1202 
(1002) 
-149 
(531) 
1.03 
(6.73) 
-2480*** 
(620) 
171** 
(69) 
1423 
(935) 
Yes 
4058 
(12924) 
0.160 
529 
(8) 
-438 
(1142) 
-897 
(979) 
-1207 
(994) 
-227 
(528) 
1.77 
(6.69) 
-2797*** 
(626) 
210*** 
(69) 
1202 
(929) 
4782*** 
(943) 
Yes 
-47314*** 
(15717) 
0.171 
529 
(9) 
male 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
-1091 
(1080) 
-987 
(1087) 
-51 
(602) 
-0.77 
(7.71) 
-3111*** 
(720) 
208*** 
(79) 
1701* 
(1000) 
Yes 
3864 
(13964) 
0.217 
434 
(10) 
female 
0.021 
(0.016) 
-1742 
(2524) 
69 
(2968) 
-1193 
(1501) 
13.41 
(19.01) 
1116 
(1230) 
-88 
(142) 
-632 
(3953) 
Yes 
21824 
(31335) 
0.103 
95 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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TABLE 10. Determinants of Choice of Base Pay: OLS, Dependent Variable = Stock Options Pay 
Total Comp 
Female 
White 
Non-U.S. 
Age 
(Age)2/100 
(Seniority) 
(Seniority)2 
Graduate 
Degree 
Log(Total 
Comp) 
Job Indicatorsb 
Constant 
R2 
N 
(1) 
-23890*** 
(5277) 
No 
35597*** 
(2236) 
0.036 
529 
(2) 
0.299*** 
(0.018) 
No 
-19274*** 
(3464) 
0.344 
529 
(3) 
0.295*** 
(0.019) 
-3353 
(4545) 
No 
-18001*** 
(3871) 
0.343 
529 
(4) 
0.323*** 
(0.020) 
-988 
(4540) 
-376 
(4373) 
-2326 
(4582) 
-3526 
(2281) 
28.73 
(29.02) 
No 
64335 
(42896) 
0.368 
529 
(5) 
0.300*** 
(0.021) 
-1524 
(4436) 
-1194 
(4261) 
-2858 
(4464) 
-3485 
(2228) 
30.39 
(28.33) 
13724*** 
(2508) 
-1377*** 
(289) 
No 
45883 
(42108) 
0.401 
529 
(6) 
0.300*** 
(0.021) 
-2372 
(4459) 
-2138 
(4294) 
-2401 
(4465) 
-2947 
(2249) 
24.11 
(28.55) 
14760*** 
(2584) 
-1460*** 
(293) 
-6816 
(4173) 
Yes 
35605 
(42515) 
0.403 
529 
(7) 
0.372*** 
(0.023) 
-5193 
(4836) 
-4478 
(4221) 
-2077 
(4295) 
-3355 
(2273) 
30.82 
(28.85) 
9297*** 
(2654) 
-894*** 
(295) 
-5607 
(4006) 
Yes 
8450 
(55362) 
0.487 
529 
(8) 
-3040 
(5395) 
-3751 
(4623) 
-4837 
(4695) 
-2374 
(2492) 
19.14 
(31.61) 
8492*** 
(2958) 
-567* 
(327) 
-5261 
(4389) 
53993*** 
(4455) 
Yes 
-596682*** 
(74249) 
0.384 
529 
(9) 
male 
0.400*** 
(0.027) 
-3647 
(4851) 
-28892 
(4883) 
-3885 
(2704) 
34.86 
(34.63) 
11802*** 
(3233) 
-1185*** 
(355) 
-6213 
(4492) 
Yes 
15247 
(62712) 
0.487 
434 
(10) 
female 
0.223*** 
(0.037) 
-11027* 
(5973) 
-19352*** 
(7025) 
-1741 
(3552) 
29.04 
(44.98) 
-3470 
(3076) 
318 
(336) 
-791 
(9355) 
Yes 
6887 
(74156) 
0.499 
95 
Notes: (a) Seniority measured in years in this table. (b) There are roughly 40 job classification indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * represent significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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